Meagan Good's Hair Stylist

the truth and the law

In the famous novel by pseudo-science fiction Slaughterhouse 5 , Kurt Vonnegut, at some point is mentioned, among the scholars who wrote of the bombing of Dresden, none other than David Irving, the British historian best known today for his theories of Holocaust denial. For this reason, and the fact that in the novel accepts the estimate made by Irving on the number of victims of the bombing (135,000 people instead of the other charged 30-40000 scholars), I recently discovered that Vonnegut has been criticized by Deborah Lipstadt, a Jewish American scholar, in a post on his blog dating back to 2007.

Deborah Lipstadt, author of the essay Denying the Holocaust, but is most famous for the legal battle that saw the object, in an English court, just to David Irving, who had sued for defamation after pages dedicated to him in the book of Lipstadt (where it was described as one of the most dangerous Holocaust deniers). The process made a fuss of the fact that the historical truth about the Holocaust, for once, was not simply discharged from academics but enshrined in a courtroom. To win the libel Irving fact would prove that his "negatives" rather than more or less voluntary distortion of reality correspond to legitimate opinions supported by facts, something for which, however, should have had the support of some other authoritative historian, or very solid arguments. His defeat was so predictable.

However, and despite the triumphalism that followed the sentence, one might wonder whether the 'deliberately distort reality to fit his own ideological vision "is not a criticism that can be moved, in addition to Irving, thousands of academics otherwise considered more respectable but dealing with less controversial issues, or are lucky enough to have made the most correct opinion, and if not particularly well suited to the approach of the Holocaust against Lipstadt and talk to anyone, as I opinion is evidenced by his criticism of Vonnegut.

In some countries (eg Austria, France, Germany and Belgium), as noted, were adopted laws that define a crime publicly to deny the reality of the extermination of Jews. David Irving (still him) was arrested in Austria in 2005 and sentenced to three years in prison for his beliefs. Of course they are laws that are discussed, and the expediency of which is disputed by many (in honor of Lipstadt, For example, it must be said that it opposed the keeping of Irving, although for reasons of expediency and not so much in defense of freedom of expression). Also because the judge appear to leave too much room for interpretation, as to what should be considered "denial or Holocaust minimization" that fall under the censure of the law.

What exactly does it mean to be negative? The craft of the historian, by definition, a certain critical distance from the traditional story of the events. The historian is always a "revisionist." Of course, there is a limit, given by common sense, beyond which the legitimate suspicion and criticism of the "official" or the more commonly accepted become evident bad faith and ideological blindness. But the question is whether the law is to place some obstacles, and how it could do so without transforming the historical truths in dogmas and pollute the work and the serenity of the town.

A Holocaust denier is usually one of three things, often but not necessarily all at once: 1) scales the number of victims (they were not six million but only four, or two, or one hundred thousand), 2) deny voluntariness of the extermination and its realization through the medium of the gas chambers, or the millions of deaths, if there were (see 1) were just a side effect of war and the harsh conditions in the camps prison, 3) deny that Hitler was aware of the extermination, which was planned without his knowledge by his evil persons, to make him a sort of spite.

is clear that although all these things, especially when taken together, outline an approach indeed disturbing, but there are margins of ambiguity such that any serious historian is likely to be singled out as a Holocaust denier, if targeted, for example, with regard to point 1, the count of victims is a delicate and difficult matter, constantly subject to revision. To what, exactly, you can get before being considered negative (remember that Eric Hobsbawm, who is perhaps the most authoritative living history, in his repute The Short Century accepts the count of four million)? Regarding the second point, it is difficult to deny the reality of the gas chambers and the systematic extermination, but I think it still legitimate to ask what percentage of victims of the gas in relation to the total (in fact, when it turned out that the number of victims of Auschwitz had been overestimated, the total number was later revised upward again to include the victims of the raids of the Einsatzgruppen). Regarding point 3, it's pretty ridiculous to claim that Hitler did not know anything, but in the absence of clear documentation is a matter of debate what were the precise arrangements by which plans of extermination were communicated: there was an explicit order, delivered by the Fuhrer, or was more of a imply, or even let it happen, delegate to subordinates?

But there is another problem highlighted by the question I mentioned at the beginning Vonnegut: "resize the Holocaust" could also mean making statements that have nothing to do directly with the extermination of the Jews. Resize the Holocaust can also mean simply deny its uniqueness, in relative importance compared to other tragedies. It may even mean the mere mention or remember other tragedies. It really would be the end for any serious claim historical research on any topic, from the Persian Wars to September 11.

Deborah Lipstadt Vonnegut says, even if unintentionally, helped to propagate the "lies". The chosen term is indicative: it is not simply want to correct what was considered an error in Vonnegut's book (taken from what was then perhaps the most important source about the bombing of Dresden, and that is precisely the monograph by Irving), but it is denounced as a falsification with intent to minimize the Holocaust. This obviously has an attitude of blackmail that it is certainly fair to say that the figures provided by Irving has been challenged by other scholars, but because myself at least should not be granted to stay proceedings on who's right? Why should not I also believe Vonnegut quite reliable in a court case, considering that he was there, while Dresden burned? And above all, why should I think that the answer to these questions depends on my opinion towards the extermination? So what?

The ideological approach of Lipstadt is confirmed by the fact that Vonnegut's book is another mistake, another lack of historical accuracy but the Lipstadt does not feel the duty to correct, they speak in Slaughterhouse 5, soaps made with the fat of Jews, according to what is un mito assai diffuso riguardo alla atrocità naziste ma la cui veridicità viene oggi contestata da quasi tutti gli storici (casi isolati di sadismo vi furono senz'altro, ma non esiste alcuna prova o documentazione riguardo un uso industriale siffatto, che non è nemmeno plausibile da un punto di vista economico). Tra i due errori, la Lipstadt sente di dover denunciare solo il primo (e nemmeno in quanto errore, ma in quanto infame bugia), il che la dice lunga sulla sua obiettività.

Molti altri esempi di parzialità del genere si possono trovare sul web, la maggior parte dei quali, ahimè, provenienti da siti discutibili e dalle finalità a loro volta assai sospette. Dovessi essere costretto a fare una scelta di campo, I certainly deploy more willingly by the Jewish scholar from that of neo-Nazis, but the point is that I would not be forced to make such choices, as they would force me to do certain bills freedom. You even think that the "Holocaust industry " (the notorious pamphlet Finkelstein) and the denial two phenomena are in fact complementary and interdependent, that instead of denying mutually support each other (there asked such as how much emphasis would be given to some colorful characters were it not for the attention that is paid by their professional indignation).

I do not want the Holocaust to become, rather than a clearly established historical truth, but always subject to examination, an unquestionable dogma, and a pawn of political and ideological agenda. As a potential history teacher (qualified to waiting time and more favorable policies) I would one day be able to say that the Nazis systematically killed six million (or five, or four) of Jews, some of which in the gas chambers of death camps, only because it is true, and not as compelled by law to do so.

Gisele Kerozene Subtitles

symbols and people

A book is basically just an object made of paper, glue and ink. Has value (if it) for what is written in, but is often replicated in many identical copies, so that the loss of one copy can be said that rarely is a great damage both economically and culturally for humanity.

However, there is a huge symbolic value attached to the idea of \u200b\u200bburning books or damage them is a taboo in our culture in part on the culture shock of Nazism and its purifying fires, on the other heirs to a rich historical tradition. In fact, it is surprising how even this taboo is well established, given the spread of this practice until recently, practiced by various churches and various absolutist regimes.

We are at the point that if a library or any institution decided to be pulped copies of volumes that holds in excess, so you can continue to effectively carry out its mission, some protest, was outraged, organizing sit-ins and even starts to mention inappropriately Ray Bradbury ( who, in his dystopian novel envisioned a society where reading is forbidden and books are being systematically burned by the authorities).

And there's also the fact that the book is often a relic, a real sacred object, such as the flag of the nation or the shirt of the football team. Things, in fact, that should be branded as superstitions by any rational person, whatever the views on what lies behind the symbol: I being a fan of Manchester United, but frankly I do not care at all if you burn the purple shirt, I look up to with compassion.

not understand the crucial importance that newspapers have in recent days to the fact that an American evangelical pastor (same name of a Monty Python) had publicly declared their intention to burn the Koran, were it not for the known law that the mother of idiots is always pregnant. Pastor idiot, idiots who have become Muslims and threatened to cause havoc (as usual, giving the West a very backward image of Islam), rather stupid that the media have given prominence to the news.

The symbolic gesture of the pastor wanted be the answer to another symbolic event whose real importance in the material world is as nothing, or the possible presence of a mosque near Ground Zero, proving further that (which I personally have long advocated) that with good Marx peace of wars and conflicts are more easily triggered by the symbols and ideologies that material and economic reasons actually (after all it is easy to agree on money, while it is impossible to agree on the only true God).

A disrespectful gesture undoubtedly that of the shepherd, who comes from the way it gives the idea of \u200b\u200bnot having a great familiarity with any book and do not know even the content of what he wants to destroy. Although perhaps it should be noted that burning a sacred text, if certainly denotes a certain hostility to freedom of thought, can not always be associated with hostility toward a particular religion, but that the text can be burned to defend their religion .

Larger burners Korans were just Muslims, at the beginning of their history, which in an effort to arrive at one price reference sought to destroy all non-compliant versions. But Catholics are not joking at all, and not only about the gospels and apocryphal texts heretics. Perhaps not everyone knows that in ' Index of prohibited books were The Bible and the Gospels, at least those in the vernacular that could be read by people not too intelligent, and this until 1965 (or until Vatican II). In centuries past we need a special permit to take possession, or the books were likely to end up at the stake, and its owner with them.

Back to us, intolerance, superstition, obscurantism: the three forms of stupidity, all having the same outcome, but there is also a form of stupidity more pure, essential, which can lead to burn a Koran. Suppose, for example, that a journalist should do a feature on American fashion to burn Korans. Suppose further that this journalist has difficoltà a trovare del buon materiale video con cui confezionare il servizio. Che cosa dovrebbe fare il buon diavolo?

Non gli resta che entrare in una libreria, comprare una copia del Corano, e realizzare un filmino casalingo nel quale si vedono solo le sue mani che accendono un cerino e iniziano a dare fuoco al libro. Fatto, servizio realizzato e pubblicato su una delle principali testate online con grande soddisfazione di tutti. Benpensanti di sinistra indignati conto i fondamentalisti cristiani, islamici arrabbiati con l'Occidente tutto, malpensanti di destra indignati contro gli islamici violenti, e giornalisti che si arricchiscono su tutto questo.

Supponiamo però che io veda il filmato e me ne accorga, che sia certo al 99% that it is a tarot. What can I do? Basically it is a serious violation of professional ethics, and not just get away with that. Perhaps I might denounce everything Striscia la Notizia, or better still a catch-as Attivissimo buffaloes. Or I could write a post indignant and groped to raise the anger of the blogosphere against the poor. It would also be right.

But there is one though. Or the fact that the journalist is not hypothetical at all a symbol, but a person of flesh and blood, and I truly risks to harm him denouncing him. Some Muslim, you never know, might even get into his head to make him pay, and something like that I do not think that even merits a knife (basically he just did not throw the puppies in a river).

And because I respect people more symbols, and more people of abstract values \u200b\u200bsuch as truth and fair play, then I should stay silent. At best, the only compromise that I would get him to write a post using only hypothetical periods.

Casadanociocom Lesbicas

problems of conventional induction

In a well-known probabilistic riddle is asked to imagine that a certain Mr. Rossi by saying, "I have two children, one of them is male, and to calculate the probability that the ' Another son of Mr. Rossi is male.

This riddle book appeared in Martin Gardner sullo Scientific American dedicata ai giochi matematici, in un articolo sulle difficoltà concettuali della probabilità. Gardner infatti si meravigliava del fatto che molte persone intelligenti non solo davano la risposta sbagliata all'enigma (50%), ma non riuscivano ad accettare il fatto che fosse sbagliata nemmeno di fronte alla risposta corretta e alla sua spiegazione.

Infatti, secondo la sua spiegazione, le possibilità con due figli sono quattro in tutto: MM, MF, FM, FF. Escludendo la quarta possibilità in virtù dell'informazione che il signor Rossi ci ha dato, fra le tre rimanenti ne rimane una sola con due maschi, quindi la probabilità è 1/3. Ovvero, una volta presa la popolazione of all those who have two children, one male, only one third of these will have both boys.

Ironically, however, Martin Gardner would have to amend his statement in the next number in the phone book, after many letters of protest received. This is because the people who did not accept the answer presented as correct, it turned out after careful meditation, then they had a point.

inductive inference (probability) can be of two types: direct or reverse. The direct inference is one that tries to infer the characteristics of the sample to those of the population (we have an urn with 50 black balls and 50 white balls, what is the probability che estraendo una pallina essa risulti bianca?). L'inferenza inversa è quella che cerca di inferire le caratteristiche della popolazione da quella del campione: abbiamo un'urna con 100 palline di colore ignoto, se ne estraiamo dieci bianche, qual è la probabilità che tutte le palline nell'urna siano bianche?

Nell'indovinello del signor Rossi è presente un'ambiguità, per cui in realtà non sappiamo esattamente cosa ci viene chiesto. Non è affatto scontato che ci troviamo di fronte a un caso di inferenza diretta, nel quale ci viene chiesto di calcolare la probabilità richiesta semplicemente considerando le caratteristiche (già note) di una data popolazione. La difficoltà, invece, è proprio to understand what population should be considered part Mr. Rossi. At that all people with two children in a male, as suggested by Gardner's solution? And why should not we instead consider the population belonging to all people with two children, of any sex?

We do not know in what capacity Mr. Rossi has provided us with that information, if that is wanted us to calculate the relative frequency of a particular characteristic in a given population (that of fathers with two children in a male), or if he was asking us to provide an estimate of our confidence that the other child is male (ie, how much to bet on that possibility). And the two things, though on this there is some conspiracy of silence, are very different.

no inference is that the reverse is not mathematically calculable. In the example of the urn and balls (100 balls of unknown color, or extract ten white), there is a precise formula, which is given by Bayes' theorem . The problem is that this formula must be used to force use of arbitrary assumptions about the so-called "prior probability", not taken from any observation, but simply postulated (perhaps by using the Laplacian "principle of indifference").

must assume, for example, that all the different distributions of color in the urn are equally likely a priori (100 white and 0 black, 99 white and 1 black, 98 white and 2 black, etc.), then calculate, using Bayes' theorem, as these probabilities vary as a function of the extractions done. But some people might dispute this principle and believe that some distributions are more likely. For example, it is clear that in a series of coin tosses are the most likely combinations that provide a balance between heads and tails (50 heads and 50 crosses) to those involving cross or only one witness, and you do not see why a similar principle can not apply to the case of the urns and balls.

The riddle of Mr. Rossi serves to bring into the open a clash between two different philosophical views, that "objectivity" (or "frequentist") and "subjective" about the chances. For some, the probability is something that concerns only the direct inference, and can be applied only when we have some objective data (statistics on mortality among smokers, for example, can help us calculate the probability of getting cancer). The reverse inference is not legitimate to use instead of calculating the odds.

For others, however, the probability is something inherently subjective, it is not simply the degree of confidence that a certain person has nell'occorrere of a certain event. It is true, it can be modified by experience (I would be irrational if the continued take of certain events do not change my choice, even take their future), but the subjective element can never be completely eliminated from the data. The best-known spokesman for the subjectivist conception of probability, by the way, was a great Italian mathematician, Bruno De Finetti, one of the genes that have trod the soil of our homeland.

The fact, however, is that cases of induction in scientific reasoning, or at least as regards the formulation of theories and the discovery of new scientific laws, always about the negative inference. The direct inference is required in practice a calcolare le probabilità di uscita di una combinazione di numeri al superenalotto, o di azzeccare un numero alla roulette. Solo casi, cioè, di "probabilità addomesticata", nei quali la popolazione di riferimento è nota perché da noi decisa e posta sotto il nostro stretto controllo.

Per quella che Nassim Nicholas Taleb chiama " fallacia ludica " molti testi divulgativi di teoria della probabilità tendono a concentrarsi solo sui casi addomesticati, dando una visione parziale e fuorviante del ragionamento induttivo e probabilistico. È in questo modo che ci si espone, sempre secondo la terminologia di Taleb, ai "cigni neri", agli eventi inaspettati che non potevano essere previsti perché non was no way to predict them, within the assumptions adopted previously in which the forecasts were made.

Any scientific law is an example of reverse inference: after observing a number of white swans, I can formulate the hypothesis that all swans are white universe, exposing them to risk, however, inevitable and incalculable, the swan black. Inevitable because we can not be sure of the correctness of the assumptions on which we merge, what is the description of the universe that would allow us to make inferences direct and therefore very reliable. One is reminded also of the turkey Russell, convinced that on Christmas Day would bring him food because so had done all the other days of the year.

Taleb, however, despite all the hatred that spreads both hands, in his book , for philosophers and experts in probability for any reason, has not discovered or theorized him first the limits of induction (already explored by Hume, Goodman and others who find it unnecessary to mention). In summary, the problem of inductive-probabilistic assumptions ("almost certainly the next ball to remove the urn will be white") is that all are based, in turn, on assumptions ("urn there are 99 white balls and a black one "), whose reliability of which is subject to the calculation of probabilities, giving start a vicious circle.

vicious circle that can be broken, perhaps noting that the scientific hypotheses, natural laws and theories are by no means simple empirical generalizations that can be put under consideration in the calculation of probabilities, but something more. But that's another story.